It - secure deletion on an SSD - might not be all bad. Now I don't have an SSD and I'm not the world's SSD controller expert, but here goes.....
I'm assuming that the SSD is formatted to NTFS and that you have TRIM available and enabled.
On a normal delete (shift/del) the TRIM command will remove the file's pages from the LBA mapping tables and consign them to the invalid page pool, ready to be erased by the garbage collector and assigned to the available page pool. A request to read the deleted pages will cause a default page of zeroes to be returned. This is effectively a secure delete. You can test this by shift/del'ing a file and then look for it with Recuva. The file name will remain in the MFT so you will find the deleted file, but the data (as shown in Recuva's header display), should show zeroes. Try this and then post whether it's true.
A CC secure file deletion will overwrite the file with zeroes (one pass please!) and then delete the file. However an SSD page write requires a new page to be written and the old page discarded, hence the additional and unwanted page writes. But all is not quite what it seems.
To write a page of zeroes the SSD would have to retrieve an empty page set to the default values of '1', and then change every bit from '1' to '0'. The SSD controller is crafty enough to detect what's happening, and instead of going though this laborious and pointless process, just unmaps the target page and sets the LBA mapping for the page to the default page of zeroes, similar to the normal delete/TRIM process.
CC finishes its processing by deleting the page of zeroes, which effectively does nothing to the SSD's pages but flags the file entry in the MFT as deleted. If the result from the normal delete test above is zeroes, then I can't see a way of testing the secure delete process, as the results are the same.
As I have said previously, there was considerable interest a few years ago when CC wipe free space was found to speed up SSD processing. I don't think anyone sussed out what was happening, but I believe that the wfs (a mass secure delete) by writing pages of zeroes was effectively trimming the SSD pages by forcing the deleted pages to be unmapped, paving the way for them to be erased and made available. This was before the days of TRIM.
If you want to do something mildly interesting, have a look at unused pages on an SSD or a flash drive with a hex editor (WinHex or something similar). The default state of an empty NAND flash page is ones, yet you will see screens full of zeroes. That's because you're being presented with the default page of zeroes by the flash controller. Funnily enough, storing a page of zeroes is an impossibility on a SSD or flash device.